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A  R  EEXAMINATION  O  F  T  HE  STRUCTURE  A  ND  CONTENT  
OF  CONFUCIUS’  VERSION  O  F  T  HE  GO  LDEN  RULE  
Bo Mou 
Department of Philosophy, San Jose State University 
Introduction 
The Golden Rule, when considered as a methodological guide for how one should 
treat others, is often explicitly expressed in terms of the principle of reversibility or 
reciprocity, as follows: ‘‘(Do not) do unto other persons as you would (not) want 
them to do unto you.’’ Nevertheless, in contrast to many other moral rules or prin­
ciples, the Golden Rule is essentially not an abstract, conventionally formulated rule 
but a presentation of a kind of collective moral wisdom. This kind of wisdom, pre­
sented either in some general form or in connection with some particular case, has 
been found in a variety of cultural and philosophical traditions.1 Furthermore, its 
concrete versions in different traditions seem to be nurtured by the insightful per­
spectives and explanatory resources historically developed in these traditions. The 
enriched contents of these concrete versions of the Golden Rule thus might go well 
beyond the mere principle of reversibility. 
The structure and content of Confucius’ version of the Golden Rule (hereafter 
‘‘CGR’’) as presented in the Analects has been an interesting and significant topic in 
both Chinese and comparative philosophy. Much work has been done to elaborate 
the CGR in the last few decades.2 Nevertheless, in my opinion, there still seem to 
be some significant aspects of the CGR that have yet to be elaborated or further 
explained. In the present article, by elaborating three interdependent and comple­
mentary dimensions of the CGR,3 I intend to examine the structure and content of 
the CGR for the purposes of enhancing our understanding of the ideas and their 
connections in the Analects (the interpretative purpose) and of seeing how these 
ideas could contribute to our dealing with some fundamental reflective concerns in 
ethics (the constructive-engagement purpose). My views are as follows. 
First, the articulated methodological dimension of the CGR consists of not just 
the principle of reversibility but also the principle of extensibility; the latter, as I will 
explain below, is distinct from the former in some crucial aspects. 
Second, one central idea, shu , in the CGR has two important aspects: its 
manifest methodological aspect and its substantial aspect; the methodological aspect 
of shu consists of the principles of both reversibility and extensibility and constitutes 
the methodological dimension of the CGR, while its presupposed substantial aspect 
serves as one starting point for the methodological aspect and constitutes the internal 
starting-point dimension of the CGR. The relation of these two aspects of shu is this: 
the methodological aspect of shu intrinsically points to the fundamental and all-
embracing virtue of ren , as an initial moral sensibility or as its cultivated result; 
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ren, so to speak, provides the internal starting point, that is, the substantial aspect of 
shu, for the methodological aspect of shu. 
Third, zhong , another central idea of the CGR, means one’s sincere and de­
voted moral commitment to those culturally and historically established social insti­
tutions such as moral rules and duties, no matter for whom, and constitutes the ex­
ternal starting-point dimension of the CGR that provides the external starting point 
for putting the principles of reversibility and extensibility into play. In this way, the 
three dimensions (i.e., the methodological, the internal starting-point, and the exter­
nal starting-point) of the CGR are intertwined as ‘‘one unified thread.’’4 
My strategy in the following discussion is threefold. First, in the remaining part 
of this section, before moving on to the substantial elaboration of the preceding 
points, I will highlight the purpose of this discussion with brief explanations of sev­
eral methodological considerations that guide the approach taken here. Second, in 
the second section, I will explain how the articulated methodological dimension of 
the CGR consists of not just the principle of reversibility but also the principle of 
extensibility, which enriches and refines the Golden Rule in a way to be explained. 
Third, I will discuss two aspects of shu and its relation to zhong: (1) in the third 
section, I will give a systematic account of these two aspects, and their relation, that 
serve, respectively, as the methodological dimension and the internal starting-point 
dimension of the CGR, and (2) in the fourth section, I will explain how zhong, as the 
external starting-point dimension of the CGR, is intertwined with these two aspects 
of shu. 
Before examining the structure and content of the CGR, I would like to highlight 
and briefly explain several methodological considerations that guide my approach in 
this essay. First, there is the issue of coherence. It is clear that the three-dimensional 
characterization of Confucius’ version of the Golden Rule sketched above presup­
poses a certain coherence in his teachings (or the ideas) in the Analects. One might 
object that such coherence does not seem to be present in Confucius’ disconnected 
remarks in the Analects and that we should not give too much credit to those sayings 
in the Analects that suggest such coherence, such as ‘‘one unified thread’’ (4.15).5 
My thinking in this regard is that the presupposed coherence in Confucius’ thought 
is claimed neither merely nor even primarily on the basis of such textual indications 
or evidence as may be found in 4.15 and 15.2.6 Even if there were no such explicit 
textual indications, the minimal coherence and connectedness of the relevant ideas 
of Confucius that are involved need to be assumed based on a reasonable method­
ological principle, namely the principle of charity, to the effect that, when faced with 
a choice of interpretations of a thinker’s ideas, and all else being equal, one ought to 
opt for the interpretation that maintains at least the minimal intelligence and viability 
of the ideas in question or the textual expressions of the ideas.7 The minimal coher­
ence of an account, or the minimal coherent connection of the ideas in the account, 
is one crucial indication of its minimal intelligence and viability. 
By ‘minimal coherence’ here I mean two things: (1) a thinker’s ideas per se are 
minimally coherently connected and thus unified at the reflective level, and her own 
language expressions, which are intended to deliver these ideas, have and show the 
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same degree of minimal coherence; and (2) a thinker’s ideas per se are more than 
minimally coherently connected and thus more than minimally unified at the re­
flective level, while her own language expressions themselves, which are intended 
to deliver these ideas, somehow do not show the same degree of coherence but 
show merely a minimal coherence or even deliver some of the ideas in certain seem­
ingly paradoxical terms.8 In both cases, given that the textual expressions are reliable 
enough, the minimal actual coherence of the textual expressions of one thinker’s 
ideas is assumed, and the minimal coherence of the textual expressions is compati­
ble with more than the minimal degree of coherence of the thinker’s ideas per se at 
the reflective level, although what is assumed here is only the minimal coherence of 
the ideas of Confucius involved at the reflective level.9 
Second, one might continually object that given some necessary minimal coher­
ence of the ideas of Confucius involved, they do not seem to possess the magnitude 
of coherence and connectedness suggested by the explanatory resources resorted 
to in the three-dimensional characterization of the CGR suggested in the present 
essay. Fair enough. Obviously, in the Analects, Confucius himself did not use 
these explanatory resources, conceptual apparatus, and terminology, such as ‘three 
dimensions,’ ‘internal starting point,’ ‘external starting point,’ ‘reversibility,’ and 
‘extensibility.’ 
What is involved here is another, but related, issue regarding the validity of such 
explanatory and conceptual resources. Note that when these resources are used they 
are not intended to assign to Confucius (not even to Confucius as a proxy figure who 
speaks for the ideas in the Analects) the same degree of articulated systematization 
and of mastery of some of the conceptual and explanatory resources, but to enhance 
our understanding of Confucius and of his ideas as presented in the text. For this 
explanatory purpose, it is not just legitimate but beneficial to employ clearer or more 
explicit conceptual resources to elaborate the otherwise implicit and hidden coher­
ence and connectedness in a thinker’s ideas that were sometimes less clearly or even 
badly expressed for lack of the explanatory and conceptual resources that are avail­
able to us but were unavailable to the ancients.10 It is clear that when a thinker’s 
ideas and line of thought are lacking in articulated systematicity in their language 
expression, this does not amount to saying that the thinker’s ideas and line of 
thought per se go without (implicit and hidden) coherence and connectedness that 
lie deep within the thinker’s ideas. Consequently, we cannot base ourselves merely 
on this lack of articulated systematicity in language expression and judge that the 
thinker’s text itself is not a philosophical work when the text was indeed intended to 
deliver her reflective ideas. At this point, with the previous and current method­
ological considerations in mind, using some adequate conceptual and explanatory 
resources available to us to further elaborate the thinker’s line of thought and her 
surrounding reflective ideas would be genuinely needed, instead of a mere pref­
erence with marginal value for the sake of enhancing our understanding of the 
thinker’s ideas, including their due implications.11 
Third, there is also the issue of the relation of an explanatory account of a 
thinker’s ideas to the social and cultural source of these ideas. One might say that, 
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because Confucius’ ethical ideas were closely related to his social and political 
agenda and were historically rooted in his times, any explanatory account of Con­
fucius’ thought needs to resort directly to the social-historical context. Some scholars 
have already explicitly addressed this methodological issue in a way with which I 
am in agreement. Kwong-loi Shun, for example, has argued that ‘‘the relevance of 
historical and sociological studies does not render a close study of the content of 
the ideas misguided, and it seems more appropriate to view the two kinds of 
studies as complementary in that together they yield an understanding of the object 
of study that is more comprehensive than either can accomplish on its own.’’12 
Elsewhere, I have provided a detailed discussion of a more general methodological 
issue in this regard (i.e., at the level of methodological perspective, whether, and to 
what extent, it would be legitimate or even expected to focus on one, instead of 
another, of the multiple aspects or layers of the object of study in view of the stated 
purpose).13 
Fourth, as indicated above, there have already been many scholarly studies on 
Confucius’ version of the Golden Rule; instead of pretending to be exhaustive, this 
essay focuses on examining the structure and content of the CGR with the afore­
mentioned purposes and methodological concerns. This essay is not intended to 
evaluate all of the previous views on the CGR or even the representative ones; what 
is directly engaged here are some of the most relevant recent views to my approach 
(e.g., Nivison’s and Ivanhoe’s views when I examine the internal and external 
starting-point dimensions of the CGR, and some other scholars’ translations and 
interpretations of relevant texts of Confucius concerning the methodological dimen­
sion of the CGR), although I do respond indirectly to some views presented in some 
of the recent literature on the topic (e.g., whether the methodological dimension 
of the CGR consists merely of the principle of reversibility—‘‘putting oneself in 
another’s shoes’’—or also of the principle of extensibility—‘‘putting oneself in the 
moral recipient’s, rather than another ’s, shoes’’). 
The Methodological Dimension: The Methodological Aspect of Shu—Principles of 
Reversibility and Extensibility 
Like its Western counterpart, by which I primarily mean the Christian version of the 
Golden Rule, the articulated manifest part of Confucius’ version of the Golden Rule 
is its methodological dimension; the two versions share the same core idea to the 
effect that one can use one’s own desires as a guide to how to treat others. Given 
this shared core idea, what constitutes the methodological dimension of the CGR? Is 
there any difference that is of interest between the methodological dimension of the 
CGR and its Western counterpart that would deliver something significant? These 
are the two concerns in this section. 
The Western counterpart of the CGR, as presented in the New Testament version 
of the Golden Rule,14 is typically articulated in terms of the following methodologi­
cal principle of reversibility or reciprocity as expressed in its positive or negative 
versions: 
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(a) Do unto others what you would desire others to do unto yourself [the posi­
tive version of the principle of reversibility]. 
(b) Do not do unto others what you would not desire others to do unto yourself 
[the negative version of the principle of reversibility].15 
In the Analects, the counterpart in the CGR of the preceding methodological princi­
ple of the Golden Rule appears to be similar. There seem to be three places in the 
Analects where Confucius directly and explicitly refers to such a methodological 
guide: 15.23 [15.24], 12.2, and 6.28 [6.30]. The articulated methodological princi­
ple in 15.23 and 12.2, ji-suo-bu-yu wu-shi-yu-ren (the tentative 
translation here for the sake of convenience is ‘‘Do not do unto others what you 
would not desire to do unto yourself ’’), is usually considered to be the counterpart 
of the negative version of the methodological principle in the CGR. Because this 
expression appears in 12.2 and 15.23 in exactly the same version, and because the 
version in 15.23 explicitly introduces one important concept of shu in the remark 
qi-shu-hu , we might well consider only the version in 15.23. The seemingly 
similar counterpart of the positive version of this methodological principle, in 6.28, 
is ji-yu-li-er-li-ren ji-yu-da-er-da-ren (the tentative trans­
is ‘‘Help others to be established the way you lation for the sake of convenience 
wish to be established, and help others to advance the way you wish to advance 
yourself ’’). 
Now what is interesting, and significant, as I will explain, is how to understand 
or interpret the methodological dimension of the CGR as presented by the texts in 
15.23 and 6.28. Are the versions in 15.23 and in 6.28 the exact counterparts of 
the negative and positive versions of the principle of reversibility, respectively? My 
strategy is to examine the relevant textual evidence through an analysis of its several 
representative interpretations as suggested or implied by its translations in English. 
Note that in the last paragraph I give the transliterations of these seemingly similar 
counterparts in the Analects (i.e., the relevant sayings in 15.23 and in 6.28) of the 
negative and positive versions of the methodological principle, but I mention their 
English translations merely in parentheses for the sake of convenience of recogni­
tion.16 The reason for doing this is to avoid question-begging; for a translation sug­
gests an interpretation. In any case, how to interpret the methodological dimension 
of the CGR as presented in the Analects is what is at issue here.17 
The Negative Version of the Methodological Dimension 
Let me first consider the issue of how to interpret the passage ji-suo-bu-yu wu-shi-yu­
ren in 15.23. This passage is typically, or in most cases, translated or interpreted in 
terms of the negative version of the principle of reversibility. So that we may have a 
clear idea of the structure and content of the Chinese original, let me offer a textual 
analysis of the passage in 15.23 by examining the three English translations that are 
usually considered to be among the most reliable or ‘‘classical’’ ones, namely those 
of James Legge, Wing-tsit Chan, and D. C. Lau. Here are their respective translations 
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and interpretations of ji-suo-bu-yu wu-shi-yu-ren together with its preceding remark, 
qi-shu-hu: 
Is not RECIPROCITY such a word? What you do not want done to yourself, do not do to 
others. (Legge)18 
It is the word altruism (shu). Do not do to others what you do not want them to do to you. 
(Chan)19 
It is perhaps the word ‘‘shu.’’ Do not impose on others what you yourself do not desire. 
(Lau)20 
It is not hard to see that Chan directly and explicitly interprets the passage in 15.23 
as the negative version of the principle of reversibility or reciprocity. Legge’s transla­
tion, on the other hand, is not exactly the negative version of the principle of revers­
ibility, because it is ambiguous and subject to two different interpretations: 
(b) Do not do unto others what you would not desire others to do unto yourself. 
(c) Do not do unto others what you would not desire yourself to do unto 
yourself. 
According to the previous paraphrase of the meaning of reversibility and reciprocity, 
what is presented by (b) instead of by (c) is the negative version of reversibility or 
reciprocity. For only in (b) is the moral agent in the imagined moral situation the 
moral recipient in the current moral situation (i.e., the situation of ‘‘putting oneself in 
another’s shoes’’), while in (c) the moral agent in the imagined moral situation is the 
same moral agent in the current moral situation. That is, in (c), you (the moral agent 
in the current moral situation) do not do unto the other (the moral recipient in the 
current situation) what you would not want yourself (the moral agent in the imagined 
moral situation) to do unto yourself (the moral recipient in the imagined situation). 
There is no switch or exchange of the moral-agent status between the moral agent 
and the moral recipient in the current moral situation and the imagined moral situ­
ation; the situation is just ‘‘putting oneself in the moral recipient’s shoes’’ but not 
‘‘putting oneself in another’s shoes.’’ In other words, what is involved in (c) actually 
is the negative version of the principle of extensibility, rather than the principle of 
reversibility, to the effect that, in the current moral situation, the moral agent does 
not extend to the moral recipient what the same moral agent in the imagined moral 
situation would not want herself to do unto herself. In contrast, the positive version 
of the principle of extensibility can be formulated as follows: 
(d) Do unto others the way you would desire yourself to do unto yourself (or 
establish others the way you would desire yourself to establish yourself ). 
Here the moral agent in the current how-to-treat-others situation extends to the 
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moral recipient what the same moral agent in the imagined or retrospected how-
oneself-is-being-treated situation21 would want herself to do unto herself.22 Never­
theless, Legge’s translation of shu indicates that he really means (b) rather than (c). 
For he interprets shu as reciprocity, as an abbreviation or summary of the central 
point of ji-suo-bu-yu wu-shi-yu-ren. In this way, in fact, Legge also interprets the pas­
sage in 15.23 as the negative version of the principle of reversibility or reciprocity. 
Now Lau’s translation, like Legge’s, is also open to two understandings. By 
examining the Chinese original, one can see that both Lau’s and Legge’s interpreta­
tions are literal paraphrases without putting into their English versions something that 
is not in the Chinese original, although Legge’s paraphrase of shu suggests that he 
actually interprets the Chinese original as the negative version of the principle of 
reversibility. To this extent, I believe Lau’s translation is most near to Confucius’ 
original in 15.23. But, at this point, one would immediately raise the question: if 
Confucius’ negative version of his methodological guidance ji-suo-bu-yu wu-shi-yu­
ren in 15.23, as Lau’s paraphrase shows, is subject to two different interpretations, 
(b) as the negative version of the principle of reversibility and (c) as the negative 
version of extensibility, what does the passage in 15.23 really mean in the context of 
the Analects? Does it mean (b) only or (c) only or both? This is a significant question. 
For if it means merely (b), then the negative version of the methodological dimension 
of the CGR would indeed be exactly the same as the negative version of the princi­
ple of reversibility. If it means merely (c), then it would capture some significant 
methodological point (i.e., the negative version of the principle of extensibility), 
which does not seem to be shared by the Western counterpart of the CGR, but at the 
same time it would fail to capture the methodological point presented by the nega­
tive version of the principle of reversibility. 
However, if the negative version of the methodological dimension of the CGR as 
presented in 15.23 covers both (b) and (c), then it would capture not only the nega­
tive version of the principle of reversibility, as its Western counterpart does, but also 
the negative version of the principle of extensibility, which the Western counterpart 
of the CGR does not seem to cover. In this way, the negative version of the meth­
odological dimension of the CGR would have a richer implication than its Western 
counterpart in this regard, and it would indeed make a difference in this connection, 
although it is yet to be seen whether or not it should be considered as making some 
significant contribution to the Golden Rule. 
In the context of the Analects, it seems that one can justifiably assign at least 
the case of (b) to the negative version of the methodological dimension of the CGR 
so as to exclude the second interpretation mentioned above, to the effect that it 
merely means the negative version of the principle of extensibility (c). For, in 5.11 
[5.12], when Zigong (Tzu-kung) claims himself to be a follower of (b) by explicitly 
saying ‘‘What I would not want others to do unto me, I do not want to do unto them’’ 
(wo-bu-yu-ren-zhi-jia-zhu-wo-ye, wu-yi-yu-wu-jia-zhu-ren 
) (my emphasis), Confucius responds that Zigong ‘‘has not yet 
reached (or met) the standard’’ (fei-er-suo-ji-ye ) and thus implicitly 
endorses this expression of (b) as a (first-person moral) standard.23 In this way, it is 
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plausible for Chan to translate explicitly the passage in 15.23 as (b). But the question 
remains: is (c) also included in the negative version of the methodological dimension 
of the CGR as presented in 15.23? 
Now, before moving on to an examination of the positive version of the meth­
odological dimension of the CGR as presented in 6.28, let us bear in mind the two 
questions raised at the outset of this section, which can be rephrased at this point 
as follows. First, which interpretation of the negative version of the methodological 
dimension of the CGR as presented in 15.23 is coherent and most reasonable in the 
context of the Analects—(b) alone or both (b) and (c)? Second, if the negative version 
of the methodological dimension of the CGR means both (b) and (c), does it make 
any significant contribution to the Golden Rule? I try to answer these two questions 
explicitly in the next subsection. 
The Positive Version of the Methodological Dimension 
In contrast to the usual interpretation (i.e., the negative version (b) of the principle of 
reversibility) of the negative version of the methodological dimension of the CGR as 
presented in 15.23, the positive version, ji-yu-li-er-li-ren ji-yu-da-er-da-ren, in 6.28 
[6.30], of the methodological dimension of the CGR often seems to be interpreted as: 
(d) Do unto others the way you would desire yourself to do unto yourself (or 
establish others the way you would desire yourself to establish yourself ). 
In other words, this is the positive version of the principle of extensibility. The trans­
lations of Chan and Lau seem to suggest (d).24 At this point, there is the question of 
whether the positive version of the methodological dimension of the CGR means 
merely (d). Nevertheless, before considering this issue, let us first figure out the im­
plication of (d) or its significance to the first question, which was reiterated at the end 
of the last subsection: which interpretation, (b) or both (b) and (c), of the negative 
version of the methodological dimension of the CGR as presented in 15.23 is co­
herent and most reasonable in the context of the Analects? 
Because the positive aspect of the methodological dimension of the CGR 
involves the case (d) in which the moral agent in the imagined moral situation is the 
same as the moral agent in the current moral situation, there seems to be no reason 
to exclude the negative counterpart, 
(c) Do not do unto others what you would not desire yourself to do unto 
yourself, 
of (d) from the negative aspect of the methodological dimension. For, generally 
speaking, when one knows what one desires, one would know what one does not 
desire to the extent that one typically does not desire the negation of what one does 
desire; when one knows what efforts one makes, or would make, to establish oneself 
to become a moral noble person, one would know what one does not desire to do 
so as to establish oneself to become a moral noble person. In this sense and to this 
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extent, (d) and (c) are essentially two sides of the same coin. So, if the positive 
version of the principle of extensibility, (d), is considered to be one indispensable 
component of the methodological dimension of the CGR, the negative version of the 
principle of extensibility, (c), would be intrinsically part of the negative aspect of 
the methodological dimension of the CGR. In this way, because the negative version 
of the methodological dimension of the CGR is presented in the passage in 15.23, a 
most reasonable interpretation of the meaning of this passage should be both (b) and 
(c) rather than (b) alone. 
Now let us go back to the issue of whether the positive version of the method­
ological dimension of the CGR in 6.28 means merely the positive version (d) of the 
principle of extensibility or also the positive version (a) of the principle of reversibil­
ity.25 According to the literal sense of the Chinese original ji-yu-li-er-li-ren ji-yu-da­
er-da-ren of the passage in 6.28, the logical subject of establishing oneself and hav­
ing oneself reach accomplishment is not given explicitly: it might be either oneself 
or another. For it is clear that, in the imagined moral situation, the moral agent of 
establishing oneself or having oneself make it can be either oneself or another. Here, 
I think Legge’s interpretation is more accurate because his interpretation leaves open 
who—oneself or another—is the logical subject of establishing oneself.26 However, 
in contrast, Chan and Lau explicitly interpret the logical subject as oneself. That is, 
the moral agent in the imagined situation is the same as the moral agent in the cur­
rent moral situation; as a result, the passage in 6.28 is interpreted as the following 
methodological guidance: 
(d 0) Establish others (li-ren ) or have others make it (da-ren ) the way 
you would desire yourself to establish yourself (li-ji ) or to have yourself 
make it (da-ji ). 
In this way, they actually interpret the passage in 6.28 as the positive version, (d), of 
the principle of extensibility because (d 0) is essentially the same as the positive ver­
sion of the principle of extensibility: 
(d) Do unto others the way you would desire yourself to do unto yourself (or 
establish others the way you would desire yourself to establish yourself ). 
This interpretation somehow ignores the case in which the moral agent in the imag­
ined situation is the other: 
(a 0) Establish others or have others make it the way you would desire others to 
establish yourself or to have yourself make it. 
Note that (a 0) is essentially the same as the positive version of the principle of 
reversibility: 
(a) Do unto others the way you would desire others to do unto yourself (or es­
tablish others the way you would desire others to establish yourself ). 
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Nevertheless, it seems implausible to think that the methodological dimension 
of the CGR ignores the positive version of the principle of reversibility. The reason 
for this does not consist merely of the fact that the literal sense of the passage in 6.28 
is compatible with interpreting it as including (a). As shown in the last section, the 
passage in 15.23 should be interpreted at least to mean the negative version (b) of 
the principle of reversibility. For the similar reason why the positive version of the 
principle of extensibility essentially implies its negative version, the negative version 
of the principle of reversibility essentially implies its positive version. Therefore, it is 
not merely the case that the passage in 6.28 is compatible with interpreting it as the 
positive version (a) of the principle of reversibility but that the methodological di­
mension of the CGR essentially includes it as one component. 
Consequently, the methodological dimension of the CGR (the CGRM) in fact 
consists of two complementary methodological principles with their respective pos­
itive and negative versions, as follows: 
The Principle of Reversibility of the CGRM: 
(a) The positive version:
 
Do unto others the way you would desire others to do unto yourself (or establish
 
others the way you would desire others to establish yourself ).
 
(b) The negative version:
 
Do not do unto others what you would not desire others to do unto yourself.
 
The Principle of Extensibility of the CGRM: 
(c) The negative version:
 
Do not do unto others what you would not desire yourself to do unto yourself.
 
(d) The positive version:
 
Do unto others the way you would desire yourself to do unto yourself (or es­
tablish others the way you would desire yourself to establish yourself ).
 
The Significance of the Principle of Extensibility 
While it seems that the methodological dimension of one Western counterpart (the 
Christian version) of the CGR consists of one principle with its two forms, namely the 
positive and negative versions of the principle of reversibility,27 the methodological 
dimension of the CGR, explicitly or implicitly, consists of two principles with their 
four forms, namely the positive and negative version of the principle of extensibility 
as well as the positive and negative version of the principle of reversibility. The 
crucial difference lies in the fact that the methodological dimension of some Western 
counterpart of the CGR focuses on the case in which the moral agent in the imag­
ined moral situation is the moral recipient in the current moral situation, while the 
moral recipient in the imagined situation is the moral agent in the current situation. 
However, through the principle of extensibility, the methodological dimension of the 
CGR also takes care of the case in which the moral agent in the how-to-treat-others 
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moral situation is both the moral agent and the moral recipient in the imagined or 
retrospected how-oneself-is-treated situation. In this case, the moral agent first re­
views or figures out the way that she has desired or would desire and in which she 
has made or would make her own efforts to (morally) establish herself (through self-
cultivation) and then extends the way to treat others. 
The significance of the principle of extensibility is twofold. First, the principle of 
extensibility would provide a distinct moral reference to regulate how to treat others, 
which distinguishes itself from what the principle of reversibility does, in the fol­
lowing sense. In our moral practice, in many scenarios that involve how to treat 
others, we simply take a certain attitude or action toward others by considering how 
we desire ourselves to treat ourselves, whether or not we would also consider how 
we desire others to treat ourselves at the same time. For example, when one deter­
mines to make all (or some of ) one’s efforts (say, to take part in some community 
service, to help those in need, etc.) to establish oneself to become a good person, 
one might take one’s own desire in this connection as one’s guide to establish one’s 
child to become a good person—say, to take the same kinds of effort as enrolling 
one’s child in some community service or educating one’s child to help those in 
need. 
Second, in some moral scenarios, the principle of extensibility would provide 
a more fundamental moral reference to regulate how to treat others than the princi­
ple of reversibility does, to the following extent. As indicated by the text in 6.28, 
both the principle of reversibility and the principle of extensibility (in their positive 
versions) claim to take care of the situations in which one considers the ways one 
desires either others (in the case of reversibility) or oneself (in the case of extensi­
bility) to establish (li ) or  advance (da ) oneself in a morally favorable direction— 
as suggested by the strong moral implications of Chinese characters like li and da 
used in the text as well as by the initial moral sensibility, which is supposed to be 
more or less possessed by the moral agent, who sets out to apply the methods of 
reversibility and extensibility (this point will be explained in the next section). One’s 
moral cultivation, from Confucius’ point of view, is essentially a kind of moral self-
cultivation that fundamentally involves how one would consciously and reflectively 
desire oneself to treat oneself without involving too much how one desires others to 
treat oneself. To this extent, and at least in those cases in which the consideration of 
how the moral agent would be morally self-cultivated would contribute to how to 
treat others, the principle of extensibility would provide a more fundamental moral 
reference to regulate how to treat others. For, in many cases of moral self-cultivation 
that involve adequately treating others, an imaginary result of one’s thought experi­
ment in regard to how one would desire to be treated by others can ultimately be 
turned into some internal power for guiding how to treat others only when the for­
mer first genuinely becomes one’s own conscious and reflective guidance for one’s 
establishing (li) and advancing (da) one’s own moral character. 
In contrast to the principle of reversibility, the principle of extensibility thus di­
rectly points to, or is intrinsically connected with, the moral self-cultivation, which is 
one central concern in Confucius’ ethical thought. The aforementioned two aspects 
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of the significance of the principle of extensibility will be given a further illustration 
when, in the next section, I discuss how the fundamental virtue in Confucius’ ethical 
thought, ren, plays its role in the two-step procedure of practicing the principles of 
reversibility and extensibility. 
One might doubt the significance of the principle of extensibility in this way: the 
Golden Rule is a hypothetical scenario; it does not matter whether what is involved 
is the way one helps oneself to advance or the way one wants others to help one 
to advance. Note that whether or not it does matter in which way one desires to es­
tablish and advance oneself would depend upon what kind of purpose that making 
such a distinction is intended to serve. If one intends to capture the common idea 
shared by both principles or by the methodological dimensions of, say, both the 
Christian and Confucian versions of the Golden Rule, then it does not matter whether 
one goes further into the rich content of the CGR. After all, the shared idea con­
stitutes the common basis upon which both the principle of reversibility and the 
principle of extensibility are considered as two principles in the same methodologi­
cal dimension of the CGR, and both the Christian and Confucian versions share the 
same methodological core. However, if one intends to realize how such a common 
core idea is implemented in some distinct versions of the Golden Rule or to under­
stand the rich content of the methodological dimension of the CGR and its relation 
to moral self-cultivation, it does matter indeed. For the two methodological princi­
ples, as elaborated before, are two distinct perspectives for looking at one’s desires; 
conceptually and methodologically, they are simply not the same thing, and the 
differences are significant in those aspects examined above. The principle of exten­
sibility in the CGR or in the context of Confucius’ moral doctrine, as emphasized 
above, is essentially connected with the way of moral self-cultivation—one central 
theme of Confucius’ ethics of virtue. In the next section, through a discussion of the 
substantial aspect of the central concept of shu in the CGR, I will further elaborate 
the point in this connection. 
One might object in another way: to make a further distinction between the 
principles of reversibility and extensibility would miss the point that at the heart 
of the Golden Rule is merely the idea that one can use one’s own desires as a guide 
for how one should treat others. Two things are worth mentioning here. First, even if 
this idea could be considered the heart of the Golden Rule, giving a further elabo­
ration of how one’s own desires behave in this connection is not only far from 
missing the point but also would enhance our understanding of this methodological 
guide, because of the two aspects of the significance of the principle of extensibility 
as examined above. Second, as I will explain in the subsequent sections, it seems to 
be inadequate to identify the heart of Confucius’ version of the Golden Rule merely 
in terms of the methodological idea per se that one uses one’s own desires as a guide 
for how one should treat others; this idea is the heart of only the methodological 
dimension of the CGR. To understand the heart of the CGR as a whole, one needs to 
consider its other substantial dimensions: its internal starting-point dimension and 
external starting-point dimension. Let us now move on to these two substantial 
dimensions. 
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The Internal Starting-Point Dimension: The Substantial Aspect of Shu
 
From the Methodological Dimension to Other Dimensions 
In the previous section, I focused on the methodological dimension of the CGR 
through an analysis of some textual evidence in the context of the Analects and ex­
plain why the passages in 15.23 and 6.28, respectively, present the negative and 
positive versions of the methodological dimension of the CGR, which involve both 
the principle of reversibility and the principle of extensibility. Does the CGR con­
sist merely of its articulated methodological dimension? Philosophers in the Western 
tradition since Kant have already diagnosed various difficulties with just the principle 
of reversibility.28 If the Golden Rule lies merely in a certain methodological principle 
like that of reversibility, then those difficulties with the methodological principle per 
se would naturally also be difficulties with the Golden Rule as a whole. There seem 
to be two approaches to how to deal with these problems. One approach is to take it 
for granted that the Golden Rule consists merely of a certain manifest methodologi­
cal principle like that of reversibility and to strengthen the Golden Rule by modify­
ing the principle of reversibility so as to avoid various counterexamples.29 Another 
approach is as follows. First, it considers the Golden Rule to consist not simply of its 
manifest methodological principle but also of some other important and indispens­
able component(s) by which its methodological principle is somehow regulated. 
Second, its focus is thus not simply on the abstract formulation of a certain method­
ological principle like that of reversibility but primarily on the way in which a con­
crete version of the Golden Rule presents itself in a certain cultural and philosophi­
cal tradition. It has turned out that such concrete versions of the Golden Rule, 
although sharing some kind of methodological principle like that of reversibility, 
actually often involve something more substantial than the simple methodological 
principle. In this regard, the Christian and Confucian versions of the Golden Rule are 
considered to be prominent cases.30 
Scholars who have studied the Confucian version of the Golden Rule almost 
unanimously agree that the CGR does not consist merely of its methodological prin­
ciple. For Confucius’ version of the Golden Rule is considered to be intrinsically 
connected with two important concepts in the Analects —shu and zhong—whose 
ample philosophical implications cannot be exhausted by the articulated method­
ological principles alone. Moreover, as already mentioned, Confucius emphasizes 
that shu and zhong are intertwined together as ‘‘one unified thread’’ through his 
Way. However, how to understand and interpret the concepts of shu and zhong and 
the relation among shu, zhong, and the methodological dimension of the CGR has 
been a controversial topic. 
In what follows, first I will explain the relation between the methodological di­
mension and the internal starting-point dimension of the CGR by examining two 
aspects of shu and their relation. Second, by focusing on the relation between zhong 
and shu, I will spell out the relation among the external starting-point dimension, the 
internal starting-point dimension, and the methodological dimension of the CGR. 
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The Dual Character of the Internal Starting-Point Dimension 
We note that Confucius uses a single character, shu, to characterize or capture the 
point of the methodological dimension of the CGR. Now an important but contro­
versial issue is what Confucius means by shu; for the concept of shu is considered a 
crucial or even defining concept of the CGR. Because of the evidential connection 
between shu and the methodological dimension of the CGR, actually no one denies 
that the methodological dimension (at least in its negative aspect) of the CGR con­
stitutes one intrinsic part of shu. Now what is at issue is this: does Confucius use shu 
merely as an abbreviation, or a proxy code, for the methodological dimension of the 
CGR, or does Confucius’ concept of shu also have a substantial aspect beyond its 
merely methodological aspect? 
Some scholars deem shu to be, in various ways, essentially just the methodologi­
cal principle of the CGR, and they emphasize the crucial role played by zhong.31 
This approach has already been subjected to some critical evaluation. Philip Ivan-
hoe, for example, analyzes some characteristic features of the methodological prin­
ciple of reversibility, noting that this principle, by itself, is inert because it can end up 
advocating either one’s subjective preferences or a set of unjustified prescriptions for 
actions. Confucius’ Golden Rule, according to Ivanhoe, 
combines an explicitly defined set of moral guidelines with a subtle appeal to developed 
human intuitions. . . . It avoids the merely subjective by advocating a set of prescriptions— 
the li ‘rituals’—which are regarded as the best possible set of rules for governing hu­
man life. . . . Rituals have an additional function; they guide one to develop a sense for 
what is right. This sense is necessary for a refined understanding of ritual.32 
‘‘The first step in this process is simply to practice the li.’’ It seems to Ivanhoe that ‘‘to 
be chung [zhong] is to serve others according to li.’’33 Or, more accurately, zhong is 
one’s service to others in superior or equal positions by means of one’s commitment 
to follow the li; in this way, zhong is ‘‘the first and primary notion in the Confucian 
Golden Rule.’’34 Ivanhoe’s point is that instead of appealing to an innate intuition 
about what one should do, the first step in the process of carrying out the method­
ological principle of reversibility is simply to practice the li; one cannot develop the 
moral sensibility needed to engage in this imaginative act until one has become 
well-practiced in the rites; so to be zhong—to serve one’s social peers and superiors 
by one’s commitment to follow the li—is ‘‘the first and primary notion’’ in the CGR. 
Ivanhoe’s account has a number of merits. First, if one thinks that Confucius did 
not hold the view that people have a ready-made innate moral intuition, Ivanhoe’s 
account provides a plausible starting point for carrying out the method of reversibil­
ity. Second, his interpretation relates zhong to the commitment to following the li, 
although he, following Nivison, identifies as the social peer or superior the direct 
object that zhong serves. Third, he seems to suggest that one can gain the moral 
sensibility, ren, through exercising the method of reversibility, and that ren should 
regulate zhong; in this way, he is right to say that ‘‘Shu is the governor of chung 
[zhong]’’35 insofar as shu results in such a moral sensibility. 
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However, despite these merits, there are also some difficulties with Ivanhoe’s 
interpretation. First, if ‘‘the first step in this process is simply to practice the li,’’ then 
to what can people appeal in those concrete situations where there are simply no 
ritual rules to follow? Second, when Ivanhoe emphasizes that rituals ‘‘guide one to 
develop a sense for what is right,’’ there remains one question: exactly from where 
does such a moral sensibility ultimately develop—from the external ritual rule or 
from the mere behavior of practicing the li or from nowhere in regard to some­
thing internal? Is there any internal foundation in the moral agent’s moral nature? 
It seems that Ivanhoe does not explicitly answer this question. Third, one obvious 
difficulty is that if, according to Ivanhoe, zhong is only one’s service to social equals 
or superiors by committing to following the li and if zhong is the first and primary 
notion in the CGR, how would those social superiors apply the Golden Rule to those 
social inferiors? Fourth, if the needed moral sensibility is totally the result of prac­
ticing the rituals, and if the very first step in applying the method of reversibility is 
only to practice the rituals, meaning that zhong is the first and primary notion, how 
could shu or the moral sensibility gained through shu be the governor of zhong 
at the very beginning? Indeed, it might be the case that these are difficulties with 
Confucius’ own account, if Ivanhoe’s interpretation is a correct characterization of 
Confucius’ way in this connection. Nevertheless, before examining the textual evi­
dence in the Analects further, one might as well suspend judgment as to whether 
Confucius’ account, or what is delivered in the text of the Analects, has the same 
difficulties. 
Setting aside the focus on zhong for the next section, in the rest of this section I 
shall argue that the key concept of shu in the CGR consists of two closely related 
aspects or layers rather than only one. The first is the manifest methodological as­
pect, which, as discussed in the previous section, comprises both the principle 
of reversibility and the principle of extensibility. The second, important and indis­
pensable, is the substantial aspect, which constitutes the internal starting point for 
applying the aforementioned methodological principles in moral practice. 
It is important to note that if one intrinsic aspect of shu is its methodological as­
pect, Confucius does not present this methodological aspect as something that one 
can start with from nowhere. It seems to me that there is clear textual evidence for 
the substantial presupposition of the methodological aspect of shu, that is, the sub­
stantial aspect of shu that constitutes one starting point for the adequate application 
of the methods of reversibility and extensibility. Let me begin with some character­
istic features of the terminology that Confucius uses to articulate the methodological 
dimension of the CGR. In his positive version of the methodological dimension of 
the CGR, in 6.28, Confucius uses the terms li and da to characterize the moral action 
of treating oneself and others. In this context, Confucius’ use of these terms clearly 
involves their moral implications, namely to help establish others morally in the way 
in which one would desire oneself or others to establish oneself. In the Analects, to 
establish one person morally is to cultivate that person into a junzi, a morally noble 
person, whose fundamental virtue is ren. In this connection, the moral implication of 
the terms li and da points to the defining virtue ren, as the intrinsic moral standard, 
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of junzi. If Confucius’ use of terms like li and da only implicitly suggests some sub­
stantial implication of his concept of shu, the whole context of his presentation of the 
positive version of the methodological dimension of the CGR arguably articulates 
the substantial aspect of shu. The passage that most clearly and completely presents 
the structure and features of Confucius’ concept of shu, in my opinion, is not the 
most often cited passage 15.23 but the following passage from 6.28: 
The renzhe (person of humanity), wishing himself to be established, helps others to 
be established and, wishing himself to be advanced himself, helps others to be advanced. 
To be able draw the analogy from oneself can be called ren-zhi-fang [the way of 
humanity or, more accurately, the way of putting ren into practice]. 
Indeed, it is understandable that, in the context of 15.23, only the prominent meth­
odological point of shu is highlighted. In this context, because Confucius is asked 
to give just one single saying to which one can appeal as an easily remembered 
methodological dictum, he explicitly gives only the methodological aspect of shu 
(actually, the negative version of the methodological dimension of the CGR), leaving 
certain presupposed starting points of the method implicit. Nevertheless, in the pas­
sage in 6.28, Confucius brings out one presupposed internal starting point of the 
methodological aspect of shu and presents the relation of the methodological aspect 
of shu to the moral sensibility of ren in a quite direct and explicit way. It is important 
to note that, according to Confucius’ concept of shu as characterized in 6.28, the 
moral agent who is entitled, or ready, to use the methods of reversibility and exten­
sibility is not a person without any initial moral sensibility but a renzhe—a person 
with (a certain degree of ) the virtue of ren (humanity), a person with at least some 
initial moral sensibility in this connection. 
At this point, one question might be raised: in this way, could anyone or only 
some people have such initial moral sensibility and thus be entitled, or take off, to 
properly apply the methods of reversibility and extensibility, according to Confucius? 
Note that this question is essentially irrelevant to the issue per se under discussion 
here, namely the structure and implication of Confucius’ prescriptive concept of shu 
and his version of the Golden Rule: if the initial moral sensibility should be a start­
ing point for properly applying the method of reversibility, the moral agent needs to 
appeal to such an initial moral sensibility in order to apply the method adequately. 
Whether or not, and to what extent, a moral agent does have this needed initial 
moral sensibility is a separate, albeit important, issue in moral psychology. Confucius 
himself only briefly and vaguely addressed it,36 but Mencius and Xunzi, two subse­
quent classical Confucians, conducted a thoughtful and significant debate over it. 
That is, although shu presupposes ren in its substantial aspect, which constitutes a 
starting point for its methodological aspect, the concept of shu per se does not pro­
vide a definite answer to the question of whether, and to what extent, one has an 
initial innate moral sensibility. 
As I see it, the aforementioned point of the passage in 6.28 in connection with 
the initial moral sensibility of the moral agent seems to be ignored in some inter­
pretations when the passage is quoted to specify shu; instead, only ren-zhi-fang is 
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emphasized when the relation between ren and the methodological principle of the 
CGR is sometimes interpreted to mean that the latter is logically and practically prior 
to the former or that the latter alone ensures the former. This approach seems to be 
implicit in some English translations of the Chinese phrase ren-zhi-fang—for exam­
ple, ‘the method toward ren’ or ‘the method of realizing ren.’37 These paraphrases 
might lead one to think that ren has not yet been made real or come into being 
before the methods of reversibility and extensibility are applied and that the meth­
odological principle is logically and practically prior to the existence of ren in the 
moral agent. In my opinion, ren-zhi-fang needs to be understood as ‘the way of 
putting ren into practice,’ 38 for it is clear in the context of 6.28 that a moral agent 
who is ready to apply the methods of reversibility and extensibility is considered to 
have already possessed some degree of moral sensibility of ren as her internal start­
ing point for appropriately applying the methods of reversibility and extensibility; 
what is not yet implemented is to put the initial moral sensibility of ren into practice 
to treat others morally by following the methods of reversibility and extensibility. 
It is also significant that this interpretation of the primary meaning of ren-zhi-fang 
does not reject, but is compatible with, the idea that the way of humanity in 6.28 
also implies the way toward, or of realizing, ren, when ren here is understood as the 
result or consequence of putting the initial moral sensibility into practice. Here one 
needs to make the distinction between ren as some initial moral sensibility that 
serves as one starting point for applying the methods of reversibility and extensibility 
and ren as the result of putting the moral sensibility into practice via the methods of 
reversibility and extensibility. Confucius’ social ideal was to produce a harmonious 
and humane society in which people fully develop their virtue of ren or humanity; 
Confucius’ version of the Golden Rule serves this ultimate purpose. And, according 
to Confucius, the application of the methods of reversibility and extensibility so as to 
put one’s initial moral sensibility of ren into practice, as a dialectical process of one’s 
moral cultivation, would result in reinforcing one’s initial moral sensibility of ren or 
achieving such a moral sensibility at a higher level. In this way, the so-called ren­
zhi-fang (way of humanity) in fact has two levels of meaning. 
First, or primarily, it means the way of putting ren into practice as some initial 
moral sensibility. Note that ‘initial moral sensibility’ here does not necessarily mean 
something like a moral sprout in Mencius’ sense (see Mencius 2A : 6, 6A : 6 –7, 
6A : 14). As already mentioned, it might result either from a certain degree of moral 
conscience in human nature or from cultivating one’s virtue in response to the ad­
vocacy of some moral ideal that is not necessarily connected with the principle of 
reversibility, or from both. Second, it also means the way toward, or of realizing, ren 
as the result or consequence of putting the initial moral sensibility into practice. This 
dual meaning reflects a dialectical relation between the two aspects of shu in the 
CGR. On the one hand, ren as initial moral sensibility provides a starting point from 
which a moral agent would commence the methods of reversibility and extensibility 
by starting on the right track. On the other hand, applying the methods of reversibility 
and extensibility in order to put one’s initial moral sensibility of ren into practice, as 
a dialectical process of one’s moral cultivation, would result in reinforcing and 
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refining one’s initial moral sensibility of ren or reaching a higher level of moral sen­
sibility of ren. 
Considering its purpose and scope, the present essay is not intended to engage 
in a comprehensive examination of the fundamental virtue ren but takes this virtue 
for granted when focusing on the structure and content of the CGR per se, as indi­
cated in the title of this essay. Nevertheless, I do intend to discuss some features of 
ren with regard to its relation to the CGR when trying to figure out exactly how ren 
serves as the internal starting point of the methodological dimension of the CGR. 
Ren or the Way of the morally noble person ( junzi ) is often characterized in 
the Analects in terms of loving one’s fellow human beings (e.g., in 12.22 and 17.4; 
also see 1.5 and 1.6). Given that the substantial aspect of shu points to ren in the 
manner explained above, can we say that the substantial aspect of shu, as one in­
ternal starting point of the method of reversibility and extensibility, is simply inter­
personal love and care? In my opinion, the answer is both yes and no. Let me ex­
plain why. 
In fact, as far as their internal procedural structures are concerned, both the prin­
ciple of extensibility and the principle of reversibility consist of a two-step proce­
dure: (1) to figure out or review the way one desires oneself or others to establish 
oneself, or the way one does not desire oneself or others to treat oneself, in the 
imagined how-oneself-is-treated moral situation, and (2) to extend or reverse the 
same way with regard to others in a how-to-treat-others moral situation. In fact, ren 
as one internal starting point presents itself in distinct forms in these two method­
ological steps. In the second step, when one considers whether or not to extend to 
others or to reverse the way one would desire oneself or others to treat oneself, one’s 
internal starting point is indeed presented in the form of interpersonal love and care, 
as Confucius characteristically emphasizes in his teaching ‘‘Ren is to love your fel­
low men’’ (12.22). However, in the first step, the focus is on how one would desire 
oneself or others to treat oneself morally so as to become a junzi; the internal starting 
point in this step should be something more fundamental than interpersonal love and 
care, namely the fundamental virtue ren itself rather than its extension in treating 
other people (interpersonal love and care). 
For, the first step in figuring out or imagining the way one would desire to be 
treated (especially in the case of applying the method of extensibility, whose first step 
is to figure out the way one would desire to be morally cultivated/treated through 
one’s own efforts) does not primarily involve how to treat others; ren on such occa­
sions does not present itself primarily as interpersonal love and care. In the Analects 
there is a passage that characterizes ren in this way: ‘‘Fan Chi asked about ren. 
Confucius said, ‘Be respectful in dwelling by oneself, be serious in handling one’s 
responsibilities, and be loyal in dealing with others. Even if living among barbarians, 
one may never cast away these principles’ ’’ (13.19). There is one important point 
worth noting here: the first item that Confucius mentions—‘‘Be respectful in dwelling 
by oneself ’’—does not even concern one’s attitude toward others but rather one’s 
attitude toward oneself. As Shu-hsien Liu points out, ‘‘jen in this sense cannot be 
interpreted as merely interpersonal love or benevolence; . . . jen implies a profound 
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reverence for one’s own life as well as a concern for others’ lives. . . . Its meaning is 
far wider than mere benevolence or even altruism; rather, it is the root of them.’’39 
I think Confucius makes or illustrates essentially the same point in passages like 
4.5, 6.21 [6.23], 7.29 [7.30], 12.1, 13.27, 15.8 [15.9], 16.10, and 19.6. For this 
reason, the internal starting point of the methodological dimension of the CGR can­
not indiscriminately be identified simply as interpersonal love and care but needs 
a more refined characterization. In the first step of carrying out the methodologi­
cal principle, shu points to the all-embracing fundamental virtue ren as the internal 
starting point so that one can figure out the way one would desire to be treated, 
while in the second step shu points to the extension of ren in treating others, namely 
through interpersonal love and care, as the internal starting point, so as to extend or 
reverse the way one figures out and desires to treat others in the first step. 
Note that, as emphasized above, because interpersonal love and care is actually 
an extension of the all-embracing fundamental virtue ren in treating others, the two 
internal starting points involved in the two steps of carrying out the methodological 
principle of the CGR are essentially the same fundamental virtue, namely ren, rather 
than two distinct virtues. For this reason, I prefer the phrase ‘dual character of the 
internal starting point’ or ‘dual character of the internal starting-point dimension of 
the CGR’ to the phrase ‘two internal starting points,’ although the latter saying would 
not necessarily result in misunderstanding once its meaning is given some necessary 
clarification. 
In the preceding discussion, I have offered a two-aspect interpretation of the 
concept of shu. But this does not constitute the whole story of the CGR; Confucius’ 
concept of zhong also plays an important and indispensable role in the CGR. Let us 
move on to this concern. 
The External Starting-Point Dimension: Zhong 
Zhong: The Li Commitment —No Matter for Whom 
How to understand zhong and its relation to shu has been a matter of controversy. I 
begin with a critical examination of Nivison’s interpretation of shu and zhong as two 
aspects, or halves, of the Confucian Golden Rule: 
(1) What I do to you, if I am in a superior position, should be what I would find it ac­
ceptable for you to do to me, if our position were reversed. I should be kind, lenient, 
considerate; if I am following a rule of action that would lead me to hurt you, I should 
relax the rule if possible. This I identified as shu. 
(2) What I do for you, if I am in an inferior position, should be what I would expect you to 
do for me, if our positions were reversed. I should be ‘‘loyal,’’ and so should be strict with 
myself even when what I am doing might hurt me, observing rules to the best of my 
ability. This I identified as zhong.40 
Nivison’s interpretation has one important advantage that is relevant to the discus­
sion here. It does not restrict the CGR merely to the articulated methodological 
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principle of reversibility. Rather, it explicitly interprets the CGR as intrinsically in­
volving such virtues as kindness and consideration (in the case of shu) and loyalty (in 
the case of zhong). That is, these virtues actually serve as a kind of starting point for 
applying the principle of reversibility. Nivison makes this contribution to paving the 
way toward a more reasonable and fruitful understanding of the CGR. 
Nevertheless, there seems to be one difficulty with Nivison’s understanding of 
zhong as a guide for personal conduct in regard to one’s social equals or superiors.41 
Indeed, when zhong is used to indicate the devoted commitment of one person to 
other persons, it seems usually to indicate the devoted commitment by a moral agent 
in an inferior position to superiors (or at most to equals). The textual evidence to 
which Nivison appeals is the following passage in Analects 3.19: ‘‘A ruler employs 
subordinates according to the li; subordinates serve their ruler with zhong.’’ Never­
theless, this statement was uttered in a certain context, namely when Confucius was 
asked about the relation between a ruler and his subordinates: ‘‘Duke Ding asked 
how the ruler should employ his ministers and how the ministers should serve their 
ruler.’’ One can find a similar case in Analects 5.18 [5.19]. However, in my opinion, 
this specific sense of zhong is only in its secondary meaning in a specific context. 
The primary meaning of zhong in the Analects, especially when it is used together 
with shu to unify Confucius’ ideas as a whole, is a moral agent’s sincere and devoted 
commitment to one’s responsibilities and duties as specified by the li (the ritual rules) 
or by culturally and historically established social institutions; the implementation of 
such a sincere and devoted commitment as a virtue can involve any moral recipient, 
regardless of the recipient’s social status. The secondary meaning of zhong here is 
only an extension of the primary meaning in the social context, in which the imple­
mentation of zhong intrinsically involves any moral recipients, no matter what their 
social status may be. In the Analects, the primary object of zhong, therefore, is one’s 
responsibilities and duties rather than other persons, much less one’s social peers or 
superiors. In Analects 16 : 10, Confucius teaches us: ‘‘The noble person (junzi) has 
nine wishes with thoughtful consideration. . . . In regard to his speech (yan ), he is 
thoughtful to be zhong.’’ 
This passage has two implications: (1) Zhong as a virtue is supposed to be 
regarded seriously by all (morally) noble persons, including morally noble rulers, 
in treating all people from all social levels, and is not restricted to social peers and 
superiors. (2) Zhong here is concerned primarily with something delivered in speech 
that is not essentially related to the social status of the involved moral recipient, 
namely the power of one’s sincere and devoted commitment to one’s social duties 
and responsibilities as specified by the li, which is often delivered via speech. 
There are several reasons and further textual evidence for drawing these two 
conclusions. First, in the Analects, the two terms zhong and xin are sometimes 
used together as a two-character phrase (see 1.8, 5.27 [5.28], 9.24 [9.25], 12.10, 
15.5 [15.6]) or mentioned together (1.4, 7.24).42 The basic sense of xin is ‘being true 
to one’s word’ (whether the word has been kept to a social superior or a social peer 
or a social inferior). It seems that one explanation of why these two terms are, and 
can be, used together in the Analects is that both involve some kind of sincere 
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commitment to obligation and responsibility, no matter who is concerned, that is 
often delivered in speech.43 Another relevant text that treats zhong in this manner is 
the passage in 12.23: ‘‘Zigong asked abut how friends should be treated. Confucius 
said, ‘Sincerely admonish (zhong-gao ) your friends, and skillfully lead them 
on.’ ’’ For one thing, in the context of the Analects, what ‘friend’ denotes is clearly 
not restricted to social superiors or peers; for another, zhong here is used to charac­
terize the sincere and responsible nature of one’s spoken admonition. 
Second, Confucius reminds us, ‘‘Can there be zhong which does not involve 
hui ?’’ (14.8 [14.7]). If zhong were aimed primarily and directly at persons, the 
preceding citation would appear to suggest that zhong would be turned toward 
social inferiors rather than social peers or superiors. For the Chinese term hui is 
usually used to indicate the instruction or education of others in inferior positions. 
For example, parents or teachers hui (instruct or educate) their children or disciples, 
but the opposite almost never happens. The suggested understanding of zhong can 
explain this: when one makes one’s devoted commitment to one’s responsibilities 
and duties, the moral power per se in such a commitment (zhong virtue in one’s 
character and its manifestation in one’s zhong behavior) constitutes a sort of moral 
instruction. 
Third, Confucius says, ‘‘When there is action to be taken, be zhong ’’ (12.14). It 
is clear from the context that what Confucius considers here is the action in general 
rather than any specific kind of action and that even if one’s action can be explained 
in terms of its social dimension and thus in terms of one’s relation with others, such 
social connections cannot be exclusively specified in terms of the relation to one’s 
social peers and superiors.44 On the other hand, from Confucius’ perspective, what 
is most relevant and important in one’s action is to follow the li devotedly. In this 
way, Confucius’ teaching here suggests that the primary object toward which zhong 
is directed is the devoted commitment to those responsibilities and duties specified 
by the ritual rules rather than to persons, much less a special group of persons such 
as social peers or superiors. 
Fourth, one can look at how the secondary meaning of zhong follows its primary 
meaning from another perspective, that of Confucius: one’s devoted commitment, 
or responsibilities and duties, to other persons is essentially a social relation and 
is eventually regulated and justified by the li, that is, the socially established ritual 
rules; zhong is thus primarily and ultimately concerned with a moral agent’s devoted 
commitment to these ritual rules. 
From the preceding discussion, it becomes clear where the characterization here 
of Confucius’ zhong is in agreement with Nivison and Ivanhoe’s line and where they 
are different. First, I agree with both that being zhong essentially involves ‘‘observing 
rules’’ (Nivison) and fulfilling ‘‘one’s obligations as defined by the li’’ (Ivanhoe); I 
agree with Ivanhoe that, from Confucius’ point of view, the social-ritual rules, to 
which a moral agent is supposed to be loyal, regulate the moral agent’s desires or 
wishes, which serve, by analogy, as a guide for how she should treat others. Second, 
however, zhong in its primary sense in the Analects is not so much a matter of one’s 
loyalty to persons but consists of one’s sincere and devoted commitment to those 
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established ritual rules that provide a guide to treating other persons. Third, the per­
sons treated through one’s zhong behavior are not restricted to social equals or 
superiors but can be any person, regardless of social status. In this way, even a moral 
agent in the most superior position, if she wants to become a junzi, has also to 
confront the issue of zhong in treating others, no matter what their social status. 
Fourth, the primary objects toward which zhong is directed are not restricted to the 
duties or obligations that one usually reserves for social peers or superiors but also 
include the responsibilities that a social superior has for social inferiors. 
Zhong and Shu 
Now there is one further issue: what is the relation between zhong and shu in the 
CGR? Because shu, according to my preceding discussion, consists of its method­
ological aspect and its substantial aspect, which constitute, respectively, the meth­
odological dimension and the internal starting-point dimension of the CGR, the issue 
is actually that of the relation between zhong and these two dimensions of the CGR. 
The issue thus might be divided into two questions: the first concerns the relation 
between zhong and the methodological dimension of the CGR; the second one 
concerns the relation between zhong and the internal starting-point dimension of the 
CGR. 
Consider the first question. One might note that, in my preceding account, I do 
not refer to the substantial aspect of shu, one’s initial moral sensibility ren, as the 
starting point for the methods of reversibility and extensibility. For, in the CGR, 
zhong constitutes another starting point for these methods. Zhong, as explained al­
ready, is the devoted commitment toward the established ritual rules that regulate 
various social relations such as the relations between a person and her superior(s) 
or her equal(s) or even her subordinate(s) and between a person and her community. 
The social-ritual rules, to which a moral agent is supposed to be loyal, regulate the 
moral agent’s desires or wishes, which serve, by analogy, as a guide for how she 
should treat others. In this way, zhong plays the role of regulating a moral agent’s 
desires or wishes when she follows the methods of reversibility and extensibility as 
a methodological tool. Note that, according to the preceding examination of the 
two-step procedure involved in the principles of reversibility and extensibility, zhong 
plays its role as one starting point primarily in the first step, in which the moral agent 
figures out the way one would desire oneself or others to establish oneself or the way 
one does not desire oneself or others to treat oneself. 
It follows from the discussion above that, in the CGR, the substantial point of shu 
(the moral agent’s initial moral sensibility of ren) and zhong constitute the double 
starting points from which the methodological principles of reversibility and exten­
sibility are brought into play. Now the imminent question is about the relation be­
tween zhong and the substantial point of shu. Because zhong intrinsically involves 
the observance of the li and serves the external starting point for applying the prin­
ciples of reversibility and extensibility, and because the methodological dimension 
of the CGR is a method of practicing ren (putting ren into practice and reinforcing 
it, as explained above), it is no wonder that Confucius emphasizes that ‘‘To over-
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come oneself and return to the observance of the li (rites) is to practice ren’’ (12.1). 
In this sense, zhong bears on the substantial aspect of shu—ren as initial moral 
sensibility—through regulating the application of the principles of reversibility and 
extensibility. Note that almost immediately after the citation above, Confucius also 
points out that ‘‘To practice ren depends on oneself alone, and not on others.’’ It 
doesn’t even depend on the observance of the li. This suggests that the li, and thus 
zhong, should ultimately be regulated by the internal moral sensibility ren—the 
substantial aspect of shu. Confucius emphasizes that ‘‘If a person is not humane 
(ren), what can he do with the rites?’’ (3.3) and he talks unfavorably about a person 
who has the virtue of zhong but is without the fundamental virtue of ren (5.18 
[5.19]). 
To sum up this section: first, zhong is the external starting point for the self-
examination of one’s own desires and one’s treatment of others by virtue of external 
ritual rules in concrete situations, whether one is in an inferior, equal, or superior 
position. Second, however, the substantial point of shu is the internal starting point, 
which points to the internal moral virtue within the heart-and-mind of the moral 
agent and from which one sets out both to examine one’s own desires and to regu­
late those rules to which one appeals in the course of the self-examination of one’s 
own desires in concrete situations.45 On the other hand, the principles of reversibil­
ity and extensibility constitute the methodological aspect of the way of putting into 
practice ren as the initial moral sensibility. In this way, by means of the method­
ological point of shu, the substantial points of shu and zhong are complementary to, 
and dependent on, each other, but with the former being the most fundamental. Shu 
and zhong thus are intertwined together as ‘‘one unified thread.’’ 
In fact, the issue of the relation between shu and zhong bears on the classical 
issue of the relation between ren and li because of a number of intrinsic connections 
between these two pairs.46 Although I cannot focus on the latter issue here, the dis­
cussion of the former issue in the context of the CGR is related to elaborating the 
relation between ren and li. For example, a distinction is made between ren as an 
initial moral sensibility, which might result from a moral conscience or from the ad­
vocacy of some moral ideal or from both, and ren as a consequence of putting the 
initial moral sensibility into practice through the application of the methodological 
principles of reversibility and extensibility. If, through the sincere and devoted ob­
servance of the li rules and duties, zhong provides a starting point for applying the 
methodological principles of the CGR, and if practicing the methodological princi­
ples of reversibility and extensibility would strengthen ren as the initial moral sensi­
bility and result in ren becoming the cultivated moral virtue, then li, through zhong, 
would contribute to shaping ren. However, ren as a whole is not shaped exclusively 
by li through zhong; rather, li itself and then zhong are eventually regulated and 
guided by ren as the initial moral sensibility, which constitutes the determining in­
ternal starting point for applying the methodological principles of the CGR. In this 
way, the relation between ren and li seems to be a kind of two-way dialectic, a dy­
namic relation rather than some one-way, mechanistic connection. 
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To help summarize the preceding discussion of the three dimensions, and their re­
lation, in Confucius’ version of the Golden Rule, a diagram can be used to schema­
tize its structure and the basic relations among its various dimensions (see figure 1). 
In the diagram, an arrow with a solid line signifies a regulation-relation (e.g., the 
substantial aspect of shu regulates both its methodological aspect and zhong), and 
an arrow with a broken line represents a dialectical reaction-relation (e.g., the ap­
plication of the method of reversibility enabling one to put one’s initial moral sensi­
bility of ren into practice would result in reinforcing one’s initial moral sensibility or 
allowing the achievement of such a moral sensibility at a higher level). 
Confucius's Version of the Golden Rule: Shu and Zhong 
Now, with the aid of this diagram, let me highlight the main points in the 
preceding discussion. (1) Confucius’ version of the Golden Rule presents itself not 
as a rule-oriented abstract principle but as a virtue-oriented moral guidance that 
consists of two central concepts, shu and zhong, and three interdependent and 
complementary dimensions: the methodological dimension, the internal starting-
point dimension, and the external starting-point dimension. (2) The methodological 
dimension of the CGR, that is, the methodological aspect of shu, consists of both the 
principle of reversibility and the principle of extensibility (I consider the latter to be a 
significant contribution of the CGR to the enrichment of the Golden Rule as a con­
structive moral guidance for several reasons). (3) The internal starting-point dimen-
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sion, that is, the substantial aspect of shu, consists of the internal fundamental virtue 
ren, which provides a kind of initial moral sensibility for putting the methodological 
dimension of the CGR into play in a twofold way. (4) The external starting-point di­
mension, that is, zhong, is the moral agent’s sincere and devoted moral commitment 
to the responsibilities and duties specified by the li, regardless of the social status of 
the moral recipient. It provides the external starting point for applying the principles 
of reversibility and extensibility: on the one hand, through external social institu­
tions, it regulates the moral agent’s desires, which serve as a guide to how the moral 
agent treats others; on the other hand, zhong itself would be ultimately regulated and 
guided by the internal moral virtue of the moral agent, which, as the initial moral 
sensibility, constitutes the internal starting point for applying the methodological 
principles of the CGR. 
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37 – Chan, Source Book, p. 31. 
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42 – The two concepts zhong and xin are clearly not exactly the same concepts; 
that is, they represent two related but distinct virtues. For a helpful discussion 
of how the two concepts developed from early Confucianism through Neo-
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